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RESUMO 
Este ensaio tem o objetivo de discutir os conceitos de subjetividade e interioridade na Renascença. A problemática 
apresentada nesta pesquisa é de que ambos os conceitos não são intercambiáveis, pois representam noções distintas 
do fenômeno semelhantes em séculos diferentes: o espaço interior de sensações, emoções, sentimentos e 
identidade. O conceito de interioridade estava associado a uma percepção do espaço interior do sujeito nos séculos 
XVI e XVI. Era sempre comparado e definido a partir da noção das aparências físicas e gestuais do sujeito, cujas 
formulações discursivas eram sempre pautadas no movimento perceptivo de fora para dentro do sujeito. Por outro 
lado, a subjetividade é um conceito moderno que surge a partir do século XIX cujas formulações discursivas 
partem do interior do sujeito, sem levar consideração as aparências físicas e gestuais. Esta pesquisa é de cunho 
bibliográfico utilizando-se de alguns exemplos da obra do dramaturgo William Shakespeare. Como se observou, os 
conceitos de subjetividade e interioridade não são sinônimos, pois partem de pressupostos filosóficos e 
psicológicos distintos, além de permanecerem até a atualizada. 
Palavras-chave: Subjetividade; Interioridade; Shakespeare. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay aims at discussing the concepts of subjectivity and inwardness in Early Renaissance. The issue 
discussed in this research is to take into account that both concepts are interchangeable, since they represent 
distinct notions of the similar phenomenon: the inner space of sensations, emotions, feelings, and identity. The 
concept of identity was associated to the perception of an inner space of the subject in the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. It 
was always compared and defined parting from the notion of physical and gestural appearances, whose discursive 
forms were always based on the perceptive movement from the outward to the inward space of the subject. On the 
other hand, subjectivity is a modern concept which emerges from the 19th onward whose discursive forms part 
form the inner space of the subject, without taking into consideration the physical and gestural appearances. This 
research is bibliographic and uses some examples from the dramaturg William Shakespeare. As it was observed, 
the concepts of subjectivity and inwardness are not synonyms, once they part from distinct philosophic and 
psychologic perspectives, besides that they are still perceive until our times. 
 
Keywords: Subjectivity; Inwardness; Shakespeare. 
 
RESUMEN 
Este ensayo tiene como objetivo discutir los conceptos de subjetividad e interioridad en el Renacimiento. La 
cuestión que se plantea en este estudio es que ambos conceptos no son intercambiables, ya que representan 
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diferentes nociones de fenómenos similares en diferentes siglos: el espacio interior de las sensaciones, las 
emociones, los sentimientos y la identidad. El concepto de la interioridad se asoció con una percepción del espacio 
interior del sujeto en el XVI y XVI. Siempre se comparó y se define a partir de la idea de la apariencia física y 
gestual del sujeto, cuyas formulaciones discursivas siempre se basaban en el movimiento de percepción del 
exterior al interior del sujeto. Por otro lado, la subjetividad es un concepto moderno que viene del siglo XIX cuyas 
formulaciones discursiva parten del interior del sujeto, sin tener en cuenta sus características físicas y gestuales. 
Esta investigación es bibliográfica utilizando algunos ejemplos de la obra del dramaturgo William Shakespeare. 
Como se ha señalado, los conceptos de subjetividad e interioridad no son sinónimos, ya que apartanse de los 
diferentes supuestos filosóficos y psicológicos, y se mantienen hasta nuestra actulidad. 
Descriptores: Subjetividad; Interioridad; Shakespeare. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION
The Merchant of Venice by William 
Shakespeare (1564-1616) is a play specially focused 
on appearances and subtle inner feelings of the 
characters. It is a play that represents the paradoxes 
between outwardness and inwardness, which is 
suggested by the Shakespearean mirroring device, 
silences, non-said, bodily gestures, breaks of 
language and twists of language. Thus, inwardness 
was a Renaissance issue emerging from previous 
forms of the representation of an inner-self in other 
literary forms. Nevertheless, outwardness was 
supposed to be false, deceitful, and even dangerous, 
whereas the notion of the inwardness was seen as true 
and sincere, even though it was imperceptible to the 
senses. The forms, molds and shapes of the 
appearances could be calculated pretentions, which 
may not be seen as the symptoms of a truthful inward 
disposition of the mind. Such paradox was not at all 
an unfamiliar issue to Shakespeare’s coevals. Thus, to 
overcome this gap certain forms of discourses 
described and identified discursive traits, which 
constituted the constellations of the rhetoric of 
inwardness in that age, which is the embryo of 
modern concept of subjectivity.  
Inwardness is an inward space of the self, 
which is constituted by feelings, thoughts, and ideas 
which appear in ever so subtle and sometimes 
puzzling details of the text. In fact, inwardness is the 
resulting perceptiveness of an inner space of the 
individual. The notion of this inward space and 
inwardness is perceived, on the first and most 
obvious level, in acts and attitudes; secondly, in 
poetical constellations which permit to make 
inferences about the characters’ conscience and their 
ethical decisions; in moments of indecisions and 
crises; or, more subtly and often overlooked, in the 
enigmas of bodily gestures, conscience, verbal slips, 
silences, implicit meaning in words and language, 
and pathos. They are determined by some mysterious 
forces
1
 of the self’s unconscious, which cannot be 
controlled and pop up in bodily feelings and 
paradoxical ideas. Inwardness is, therefore, the 
inward dispositions of the self wherein thoughts, 
feelings, ideas, and anxieties are floating and are 
incrusted in the individual’s unconscious.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The Modern Concept of Subjectivity 
Considering inwardness as an epochal 
cultural construct, its traits and shapes are quite 
different from the modern concept of subjectivity. 
Inwardness is still a broader concept in English 
Renaissance Age, rather than our modern concept of 
subjectivity, which is inevitably pervaded by 
philosophical concepts and psychoanalytic 
assumptions. In fact, the notion of modern subject is 
                                                             
1 For the idea of the mysterious forces in inwardness, see later on 
the discussion of McGinn’s ideas on his work Shakespeare’s 
Philosophy, 2007. 
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invested with different traits enhanced by diverse 
philosophical and psychoanalytic discourses and 
assumptions. 
Freud (2006) depicts the self as endlessly lost 
and dissolving in the confusion of the unconscious. 
Human being is inexorably split by an existential 
shame supervened by superegoical mechanisms 
which control and determine the ego. Lacan’s subject 
is determined by the emergence of another figure on 
the mirror, which makes him aware that the complete 
image projected onto the other is merely the illusion 
of totality of the self. In the Stade du Mirror essay, 
Lacan parts from the neurological assumption that the 
human beings are born in a foetus form, who cannot 
control its movements, walk, or even keep in a erect 
position. He points out that until six months old the 
baby expresses itself in a set of spasmodic and joyful 
reaction in its gestures and movements. Then, the 
mirror phase is considered by Lacan as an 
identification process, whereby it sees mainly in the 
mother’s presence just a continuum of its body, as if 
the mother were its own self. The only thing it 
identifies is itself joined with the breast of the 
mother. This is an identification of the alienated 
image of the identity, which can only be configured 
through the imago. This alienated imago is a 
hallucinatory projection, which constitutes the foetus’ 
identity for a while, in a phagocytizes process, 
through which the foetus-baby imaginarily wishes to 
cannibalize the imago. This mirror’s stage is more 
likely a fortress where the self produces barriers to be 
isolated. For Lacan,  
 
Correlatively, the formation of the Self 
symbolizes oneirically in a fortified 
field, or even a stadium, which spreads 
out, from the internal arena until its 
walls, until its limits of rubble and 
swamps, two fields of opposing fight 
wherein the subject is entangled seeking 
for the high distant inner castle, whose 
form […] astonishingly symbolizes the 
id […] We see realized these framework 
of the fortified work whose metaphor 
spontaneously emerges, as if it had 
popped up from the very symptoms of 
the subject, in order to designate he 
mechanisms of inversion, isolation, 
redoubling, annulation and drive of the 
obsessive neurosis. (LACAN, 1998, p. 
101) 
 
This fortress image could be seen as the id 
image and construction. However, when the baby 
recognizes somebody else’s presence, like the 
father’s presence, it immediately feels this paternal 
interference as a ‘primordial hatred’, making the baby 
split from the specular image projected onto the 
mother. Such split from the image constitutes the 
moment of the individuation.  
Lacan introduces the bi-dimensional mirror in 
the image before the oedipal phase. It suggests the 
unified image, which is so important due to the 
child’s lack of notion of bodily integrity. This notion 
complements the bodily totality that the self is not 
unified to the image. It is menaced by the other’s 
presence and feels then the consequent resentment of 
such menace. Thus, this non-existent subject projects 
itself onto the other, as if it would jump into the 
other’s figure. The recognition of the other is shown 
as negation, the other is negated as saying – ‘he is not 
me’ – and by negating the other, the baby 
imaginatively tries to occupy the place of the other. 
When the third element is acknowledged, then 
something like a symbolic identification is 
constituted by rivalry. Thus, the mirror’s stage is an 
idealisation of the image, though it negates the other, 
because fantasmatically it has to be sort of 
eliminated, which leads to rivalry, distrust, or late 
mimetic hostility. According to Lacan, ‘this moment 
when the mirror’s stage is constituted, it inaugurates, 
by the identification with the imago of the other and 
by the primordial drama of jealousy […], the dialectic 
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which from thim moment onwards links the Self to 
the socially elaborated situations.’ (Lacan, 1998, p. 
101). And the child being a foetus does not recognize 
the mother as the other, but just as the same person. 
Then the recognition of the presence of the father 
leads to the consequent recognition of selfness and 
the other. As Lacan points out,  
 
This development is experienced as a 
temporal dialectics which projects 
decisively in history of the individual’s 
formation: the stade du mirroir is a 
drama whose inner impulse precipitates 
itself from the insufficiency to an 
anticipation – and which makes for the 
subject, got in this allurement of spatial 
identification, the fantasies which 
happen from the moment of a lacerate 
image of the body until a form of totality 
[...] and until the moment when the 
armour finally taken upon himself of an 
alienated identity will mark in its rigid 
structure all his mental development. 
Thus, the split of the circle of the 
Innenwelt to the Umwelt generates the 
inexhaustive quadrature of the 
inventorying of the I. (LACAN, 1998, p. 
100) 
 
From the image of this “lacerate body” from 
this moment on, the foetus can just develop being 
identified in this compulsively primordial process of 
phagocytizes in every image it sees which reminds it 
of the imagos incrusted in its unconscious. Thus, the 
subject is the Being of the lack, which always seek 
for satisfying the endless necessity of totality 
imagined the mirror’s stage. 
Face to such subleties of modern conception 
of subjectivity, the term inwardness seems to be more 
feasible to Shakespeare’s drama, because it 
corresponds to the English Renaissance notion of 
inwardness. Our modern concept of subjectivity is a 
term which entered in the English lexicon just later 
on in the late 18
th
 century. Although some could 
argue that inwardness is merely a synonym for 
subjectivity, it seems rather specific to the age, 
because the emergence of discussions and writings 
about it demonstrate a concern of defining and 
grasping it with Renaissance epochal frameworks. Its 
conception was evident and defined only in the 
opposition between inwardness and outwardness: 
inwardness was said to be true and sincere, whereas 
outwardness was not always able to express the 
inward space and dimensions of the self. Thus, 
outwardness or appearances of the self could be 
invented and pretended. However, it is not the result 
of language and rational construction, but a historical, 
cultural, social and even institutional construct of the 
age, which presumed to perceive the individual’s 
inward feelings, thoughts, and ideas. Inwardness is 
the perception of the inner-self from outside to an 
imagined inside, perceived in the bodily traits and 
gestures, whereas subjectivity is the rhetorical 
construct of imaginable inner feelings in poetry and 
philosophy, in an opposite movement form the inside 
to the outside.  Although the play will be analysed in 
terms of inwardness, sometimes it is necessary to 
illuminate some traits of inwardness by using some 
modern psychoanalytical assumptions which 
contribute to understand Shakespeare’s mimeis of 
inwardness. It is worth noticing that any analysis of 
inwardness will be inevitably pervaded by our 
modern sense of self and subjectivity.  
 
Early Renaissance Concept of Inwardness 
This dichotomy between inwardness and 
outwardness was a noticeable trait in Renaissance 
especially for Shakespeare’s coevals. They were quite 
aware and worried about the relations between the 
outward and inward dimensions of the self and of 
things. In that sense, Katharine Eisaman Maus, in her 
work Inwardness and Theater in the English 
Renaissance (1995), analyses inwardness opposed to 
outwardness. She takes into account the differences 
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between an unutterable inner-self and a theatrical 
outward which could be intentionally shaped. She 
studies the epistemological anxieties caused by this 
gap, the social practices created to keep them and the 
political purposes which they serve for. Despite the 
controversies about the consciousness of inwardness, 
Katharine Maus observes the emergence of a great 
number of speeches, which presented distinctions 
between inwardness and outwardness as a common 
place and a rhetorical and discursive distinction very 
familiar in 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries. For instance, 
Edward Jorden in A Brief Discourse of a Diseased 
Called the Suffocation of the Mother notes the 
differences between the inward and outward causes 
of that disease; John Dod and Robert Cleaver 
distinguish two main manners of violating the Ten 
Commandments: inward and outward transgressions; 
William Perkins distinguishes, in his essay The whole 
treatise of the cases of the conscience (1606), the 
inward and outward sadness, inward and outward 
cleanness, inward and outward regret, inward and 
outward veneration.
2
 Likewise, beforehand Augustine 
had defined two distinctions in human beings: the 
homo interior and the homo exterior (1995, p. 16), 
the inward man and the outward man. Such 
distinctions were never questioned by polemicists of 
the age.  
According to Maus, the distinctions between 
the inward and the outward overcome this visibility – 
                                                             
2 These discourses of the age also defended a cautious distinction 
between the inward and the outward dimensions. In King James’ 
work Basilicon Doron, the king himself recommended a careful 
orchestration of the actions and visual gestures of the king, which 
can reveal his virtue, for it serves to reveal the inwardness and 
interpret ‘the inward disposition of the mind’ to those who cannot 
see beyond the visual signs and, therefore, ‘must only judge of 
him by the outward appearance’ (1995, p. 05). Another example 
is that of George Hakewill, in his work A Discourse against 
flattery (1611). Hakewill describes ways to recognize a hypocrite: 
“wolves in sheep’s clothing, richly decorated apothecary boxes 
with poisons inside, beautifully bound tragedies, snowy Mount 
Etnas with volcanic interiors.” (1995, p. 05-06). The flatterers of 
the court awaken fear and disregard of political commentators of 
the 16th and 17th centuries, because ‘outwardly they show 
themselves with the face of friendship, within they have more 
malice than the sings of scorpions’. (1995, p. 05-06).  
and thus its validity is untouchable. The outward, on 
the contrary, was distrusted and sometimes 
considered false, partial, deceitful, and unsubstantial. 
(1995, p. 04-05). Tudor’s and Stuart’s polemists such 
as Stubbes, Northbrooke, Rankin, Gosson, and 
Prynne acknowledged the separability of a favoured 
and ‘truthful’ inwardness and a sociably visible 
outwardness, though counterfeited. They 
approximated such separation, stating that men 
should seem outwardly what they were and felt 
inwardly: “People and things are inwardly”; “people 
and things seem outwardly”. (Maus, 1995, p. 4-5). 
Thus, personal inwardness was problematically 
undermined by the epistemological anxieties, and 
created the gap between the inaccessible inwardness 
and the possible counterfeited outwardness.  
In that sense, some considered impossible to 
perceive what an individual actually felt and was 
inwardly. But according to other theorists, the 
distinction between the inward space and the outward 
appearances was necessary, because it was 
impossible to know a man simply through his 
appearance. As Maus states,  
 
The alienation or potential alienation of 
surface from depth, of appearance from 
truth, means that a person’s thoughts and 
passions, imagined as properties of the 
hidden interior, are not immediately 
accessible to other people. Hamlet is not 
original in maintaining that the sight of 
his downcast visage is not the same as 
the sight of his grief. (1995, p. 05).  
 
That was an anguishing problem in a time 
when new religious practices began to doubt ancient 
rituals, in exchange of refrained and less theatrical 
rituals, preached mainly by Protestantism. In such 
case, Protestants considered themselves practicing 
inward truth, whereas they accused Catholics of 
cultivating only outward deceitful rituals (Maus, 
1995, p. 15 and 17). In her opinion, inwardness was 
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shaped mainly by religious impositions which 
syncretized different forms of rites, provoking then 
the distrust and anxiety to those new forms of rites 
and doctrines. Consequently, the perception of a 
person’s gestures and appearances unleashed the 
conjecturing of what this person might be thinking 
and feeling. Maus is quite aware of the possibility of 
failure in trying to perceive inwardness: ‘The 
inwardness of persons is constituted by the disparity 
between what a limited, fallible human observer can 
see and what is available to the hypostasized divine 
observer […]. This disparity is subject to fluctuation, 
and to intentional manipulation both by the viewer 
and the viewed.’ (1995, p. 11). The possibility of 
deception was one of the main concerns, but the 
possibility of fluctuation and incongruities were also 
taken into account, since the self was not just a fixed 
and full-constituted entity, but was constantly 
dependent on outward cultural constructs, such as the 
determining rules of the State, church, family, school, 
and so forth. In that sense, Maus conceptualizes 
inwardness both historically and culturally:  
 
if the religious categories in which the 
English Renaissance tried to 
comprehend itself often seem to us to 
involve glaring mystifications of social 
and political dynamics, so too our 
secularist interpretative axioms may 
blind us to their own explanatory 
limitations. Perhaps our suspicion of 
privacy, inwardness, subjectivity, soul, 
and so forth – our conviction that such 
terms beg to be debunked – has less to 
do with what counts as a satisfactory 
explanation. (1995, p. 27) 
 
She is conscious of our limited tools of 
analysis due to this epistemological gap between the 
outward perception and inward truth. But there is no 
possibility of achieving an ‘inward truth’, even after 
the long journeys of Psychoanalysis searching for an 
inward truth. For example, Hamlet never really finds 
his truth. Anticipating our 21
st
 century experience, we 
ultimately never come to know ourselves, as in 
Freud’s unendliche Analyse: infinite analysis points 
to that problem of endless erring in the labyrinth of 
inwardness, due to the lack or rejection of outward, 
objective limits and goals. Though all the attempts 
undertaken in the Renaissance to define inwardness 
could have failed, the acknowledgement of the 
existence of an unsearchable inward space proves the 
existence of its notion in that age. 
However, different from our modern 
concept of subjectivity, inwardness suffered of a lack 
and failure of philosophical definition:  
 
It may be well true that Renaissance 
notion of interior truth turn out to be 
philosophically defective: they are rarely 
elaborately or rigorously argued for. But 
lack of rigor neither limits the extent of, 
nor determines the nature of, the power 
such ideas can exert. Murkiness and 
illogicality may, in fact, enhance rather 
than limit their potency. (1995, p. 28) 
 
It is rather philosophically and even 
psychologically limited. Despite such lack and 
failure, there were some attempts to overcome these 
problems. For example, some polemists such as 
Thomas Wright created a treatise of techniques to 
discover people’s minds. Nevertheless, he stated that 
no one can ‘enter a man’s heart’ (1995, p. 29). Such 
attempts were quite contradictory, because the 
polemists and writers created evasive arguments to 
demonstrate their concern. Thus, Maus defines 
inwardness and makes a distinction between 
historical and philosophical categories:  
 
So distinguishing between what I would 
call a “philosophical” argument and a 
“historical” one seems important. And 
this distinction is related to another: the 
difference between the origins of an idea 
and its effects once it becomes culturally 
available. The new-historicist critique 
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insists, correctly in my view, that the 
“self” is not independent of or prior to 
its social context. (1995, p. 28)  
 
In that sense, there are two important 
fantasies in English Renaissance: the first one is that 
‘selves are obscure, hidden, ineffable’; the other 
fantasy is that the selves are ‘fully manifest or 
capable of being made fully manifest’. (1995, p. 28). 
Maus proposes that these notions seem to be 
contradictory, ‘but again and again they are voiced 
together, so that they seem less self-cancelling than 
symbiotically related or mutually constitutive.’ (1995, 
p. 29). Therefore, she views inwardness as 
constituted not by a determined set of features, but by 
variable and fluctuant traits. Our modern concept of 
subjectivity is voiced by philosophical and 
psychoanalytical frameworks, whereas Renaissance 
notion of inwardness was imagined as a rather social, 
historical and cultural construct. Thus, Maus 
concentrates her analysis on the historical and 
cultural arguments. She disdains philosophical and 
psychoanalytic assumptions, even though it is evident 
the psychoanalytic framework working on the 
background of her analysis. As she asserts, 
 
‘Subjectivity’ is often a loose and varied 
collection of assumptions, intuitions, and 
practices that do not all logically entail 
one another and need not appear together 
at the same cultural moment. A well-
developed rhetoric of inward truth, for 
instance, may exist in a society that 
never imagines that such inwardness 
might provide a basis of political rights. 
The intuition that sexual and family 
relations are ‘private’ may, but need not, 
coincide with strong feelings about the 
‘unity of the subject’, or with 
convictions about freedom, self-
determination, or uniqueness of 
individuals, or with the sense that the 
self constitutes a form of property. It 
seems to me a mistake to assume that all 
these matters can be discussed at once, 
that they are necessarily part of the same 
cluster of ideas. (1995, p. 29-30)  
 
In that sense, inwardness can present just an 
isolated feature or few elements voiced together, 
whereas subjectivity comprehends symbiotic psychic 
dimensions of the self. However, Maus is rather 
interested in what she defines as ‘rhetoric of 
inwardness’ (1995, p. 30), i. e., the linguistic, 
discursive, cultural, and social constellations that 
pervade inwardness. The concern about cultural and 
historical issues locates the difference of our 
philosophical and psychological concerns and the 
Renaissance concerns about inwardness. Thus, there 
is no determined set of constellations which defines 
inwardness in an age, even though they can appear 
together.  
In addition to defining inwardness Maus 
states that theatre historians researched a siginificant 
quantity of data about the representations of the plays 
and the audience’s aesthetic experience. In her 
opinion,  
 
They speculate about what kinds of 
people attended the theater and what 
such people were likely to notice. They 
make assumptions about the ways in 
which the play structured the experience 
of spectators, and about the ways in 
which spectators may have resisted the 
imposition of that structure. My own 
methods are unavoidably involved in the 
same combination of suspicion and 
inductive empathy I shall be 
endeavoring to discuss. (1995, p. 34). 
 
If in Maus’s analysis inwardness is an 
epochal notion determined by cultural, historical, 
social dimensions, it is important to refer to many 
historical details, for example, those presented by 
Kaplan (2002) and Shapiro (1996). Thus, when one 
sees the play and its characters through historical 
facts, one can see them completely different and 
sometimes in an opposed way. Coupled with that, it is 
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necessary to imagine the audience’s reaction towards 
the characters’ attitudes and act on stage; thereto it is 
worth using texts from Renaissance age, because 
conjecturing what the auditors’s reaction could be in 
the theatre provides the analysis with multiple 
possibilities of types and qualities of inwardness.  
Moreover, one can never forget that the 
construction of a play and consequently the 
characters’ inward space are rather pervaded by the 
spectators’ reactions and perception. Shakespeare 
wrote for both the high aristocracy and the mob; 
therefore he constantly thought of creating 
ambiguities and meaning which could only be 
grasped and understood by the fewer educated 
spectators. For example, when Antonio criticizes 
Shylock for citing the scriptures for his own interests, 
some people could agree with Antonio and claim that 
Shylock’s misuse of the Bible was religiously 
condemnable. On the other hand, fewer educated 
playgoers could have an opposing reaction: Shylock’s 
discussion of the biblical texts would not be 
disregarded, because Jews were commonly asked to 
help Protestants to interpret difficult and complex 
passages of the Holy Bible, as Kaplan (2002) 
presents in full reports of the late 16
th
 century. Then, 
the spectators’ responses to the play could be partly 
determined by common-places and prejudices of the 
age, just as they could be partly determined by more 
accurate knowledge of the important role of Jewish 
scholars for the understanding of the scriptures. 
Therefore, to oppose differents facts from the age and 
to imagine the audience’s reactions enable the reader 
to see possible ambiguities embodied in the text. 
These altenative interpretations enable to analyse the 
text based on co-existent historical and cultural facts 
in Shakespeare’s age, facts which pervade the 
ambiguities of the play. 
In that sense, Drakakis (1998) points out the 
necessity of ‘a simultaneous awareness of the 
difference which a text such as The Merchant of 
Venice generates between its own historically specific 
concerns and those of the modern world, and of its 
sameness in so far as those historical differences can 
be collapsed into a timeless presence.’ (1998, p. 182). 
For Drakakis, in a play such as this, complex and 
problematic historical elements are frequently 
‘filtered out through the cognate processes of reading 
and theatrical representation’. (1998, p. 182). Thus, it 
is necessary (as in Brecht’s words) to analyze in 
necessarily ‘critical mediations of literary productions 
of the past’ with our own views on the play.  
Furthermore, there are some psychic 
dimensions which Shakespeare represented in his 
characters. He perceived, at least intuitively, that 
there are some mysterious dimensions which the 
individual cannot control in his inward dispositions of 
the mind. Shakespeare overcame his contemporary 
writers and represented those mysterious uncontrolled 
dimensions of the self in the drama. Though Maus 
simply analyses inwardness as a cultural and 
historical event, Shakespeare saw more than that: he 
saw some obscure and mysterious psychic traits 
which determined and shaped inwardness. The 
inward mysterious forces of the self, pointed out by 
McGinn (2007), are obscure uncontrolled dimensions 
of the inward space of the self. It is something 
Shakespeare perceived in common human behaviour 
and represented it through the characters’ silences, 
verbal slips, ruptures of speech, the character’s 
conscience, pathos, gestures, and bodily feelings. 
Such mysteriousness is incrusted in inwardness and 
determines the self’s actions, feelings, emotions, 
ideas and thoughts. 
In that sense, Collin McGinn also discusses 
relations between the self and the phylosophical 
possibilites of knowing the self, in his book 
Shakespeare’s Philosophy (2007). McGinn goes 
beyond Maus’ discussion about inwardness, because 
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he perceived the uncontrolled obscure inward 
dimensions of the self in Shakespeare. He presents 
the mysterious forces which control the characters’ 
inward dispositions of the mind. Inwardness is an 
inner space incrusted in inward mysterious 
dimensions, which come out in judgement, 
conscience, and anxieties. He analyses the problem of 
inwardness considering the self, his constitution, and 
his implications in some of Shakespeare’s plays.3 
Thus, Shakespeare works with several levels in his 
plays: judgements and conscious manipulations, but 
very often also with involuntary gestures and 
anxieties which suggest desires, intentions, reasoning 
which are beyond the conscious will and feeling; i. e., 
murky things which the subject cannot control any 
longer. However, in Kantian assumptions judgement 
is pervaded by psychic traits, which mingle with and 
subtly inscribe themselves into one’s perception. 
When one sees another person’s action, one can see 
what he perceives in it through vague impression, 
suggestions and outward signs. Consequently, 
judgement can reveal part of the viewer’s inward 
feelings, ideas, thoughts, and anxieties. 
                                                             
3 However, McGinn seems to have a terminological lack of 
accuracy in his book: he takes notions as inwardness, interiority, 
identity, self, individual in a very mixed way: he refers to interior 
and exterior dimensions, to self, to character, to personality, to 
inwardness, without specifying what each of these dimensions 
exactly means, whether they are similar or distinguished. Perhaps 
he is referring to all these categories together just to make it clear 
that what we call inwardness and its synonyms are just vague 
definitions, or just a mere attempt to define what these inward 
‘mental flux’, sensations, feelings, and thoughts are. He may 
ironically use all these known definitions to suggest that what we 
call inwardness, personality, self is not possible to be defined, 
once we have to face an epistemological gap: we have no tools, 
no instruments to measure and define what this self exactly is. We 
can just point out some ideas, suggestions, and evasive notions of 
what it might be. Thus, we have to look at these constellations of 
mental flux that vary and change constantly in order to construct 
and sketch just one vague idea of the self or inwardness. He 
employs so many words to suggest that it is not possible to define 
inwardness according to fixed and precise definitions. He might 
also use this lack of accuracy just to suggest that the gap between 
inward and outward is so complex, that we are not able to achieve 
plainness about inwardness. As he points out, 'the richness and 
variety of Shakespeare’s metaphors for the concealment of inner 
thoughts and motives suggests careful attention to the 
phenomenon described. The human ability to deceive and 
dissemble is indeed remarkable; it is one of the main 
distinguishing characteristics of our species.' (2007, p. 103).  
In the same sense, in McGinn’s opinion 
inwardness, self, identity are impossible to be defined 
just by philosophical concepts and epistemological 
categories. There is something in the self that goes 
beyond our understanding and which deludes us all 
the time. Therefore, he puts at stake the fixed, 
determined definition that the self, inwardness and 
personality are substantially definable, because when 
we try to define ourselves we might be deluding us 
and presenting an evasive idea of all these ‘mental 
fluxes’. When we talk about ourselves, we may be 
talking, not exactly what we are, but what we seem 
or want to be. In that sense, indeterminacy, vagueness 
and a set of ‘mental fluxes’ make room to ambiguity, 
paradoxes, and incongruity of the self. 
McGinn starts the discussion emphasising 
man’s desire for knowledge and scepticism in 
Western Culture. He affirms that Shakespeare added 
to the ancient scepticism a new concern – ‘the 
problem of other minds.’ (2007, p. 07). He enhances 
the same issue discussed by Maus (1995), the 
opposition and split between outwardness and 
inwardness. Nevertheless, McGinn questions how it 
is possible to know what other people are thinking, 
their feeling and intentions, because ‘all we observe 
of another person is his or her body’ (2007, p. 07). 
There is something that is not perceived in other 
people’s mind, something hidden, ‘which we can 
only infer from what is publicly available’. (2007, p. 
07). He states that there is no way of knowing what is 
within a person’s mind, because there is an 
‘asymmetry’ between one’s knowledge of the other’s 
mind (2007, p. 07). Such asymmetry enhances that 
the mind is private and the body is a public property, 
and we can only infer one’s mind by bodily and 
language signs. In that sense, ‘the link between 
outward behavior and inner state of mind seems 
tenuous and fragile’. (2007, p. 07-08). Such split 
turns out to be a problem in all social domains, once 
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all kinds of relationships are conditioned by the  
 
fundamental inaccessibility of other 
minds […]. Everything becomes a 
matter of interpretation, of competing 
hypotheses, with the perpetual 
possibility of missive error. 
Overconfidence is the besetting sin here, 
as people leap to unwarranted 
conclusions about the motives and 
thoughts of others. (2007, p. 08).  
 
The only way of trying to know others’ mind is by 
interpreting and judging, not what exactly occurs in 
their minds, but that we think what goes in their 
minds. Therefore, interpreting one’s bodily gestures 
cand lead to confusion, misreading and 
misunderstanding.  
Although McGinn recognizes the 
epistemological gap in the analysis of inwardness, he 
considers the Self as a fundamental entity to analyse 
this issue. When dealing with arts, and, in this case, 
particularly the drama, the hidden dimensions of the 
selves are essential for dramatic tensions. The author 
considers that drama requires selves in action and 
‘conscious beings equipped with a suitably rich 
psychology’ (2007, p. 09). Dramatic tension also is 
about changes of the self over time. In that sense, the 
self and the circumstances around him are 
interchangeable and the self is determined by outward 
circumstances. The self is not just configured by 
inner motives or dimensions, but there are also outer 
features that contribute to determine it. Thus, McGinn 
asks: ‘the body has a collection of physical traits that 
give it the specific form it has, but does the person 
have a range of mental traits that collectively define 
his or her personality?’ (2007, p. 09). It is important 
to focus then on personal indeterminacy, which 
makes the self not a pre-determined entity, but 
pervaded by floatation between different and 
interconnected sets of inward and outward 
constellations. This is central for the understanding of 
the characters, their sometimes enigmatic changes 
which make the character morph before us. (2007, p. 
09).  
Nonetheless, the self is not the soul as 
conceived in religion. ‘Shakespeare regards the self 
as interactive and theatrical. The self is interactive in 
the sense that it makes little sense to ask what 
personality someone has independent of the social 
interactions in which he engages’. (2007, p. 10). 
McGinn links personality to theatre, because 
‘personality is essentially a matter of how you 
interact with others – how you affect them, and how 
they affect you. The self is also theatrical in the sense 
that it is often best understood in terms of roles a 
person plays.’ (2007, p. 11). Though this idea seems 
superficial McGinn states that building up the self is 
not faking, but we embody a role which seems 
sincere and natural. (2007, p. 11). Thus, it is 
important to remember that the self is constituted by 
the person’s choices and the circumstances around 
her.  
Since McGinn refers to the actor’s 
metaphor to illuminate the idea of the self, the self as 
theatrical and interactive, we can better perceive 
inwardness if we contrapose it to Greenblatt’s idea of 
‘self-fashioning’, in his book Renaissance Self-
Fashioning. For him, self-fashioning is the 
manipulation of appearances for conquering social 
and political domain and prestige in the Renaissance 
Age. It is the conquest of an ever-growing inward 
space of perceptiveness, psychological awareness of 
the self and of the subtle interactions with others. 
Greenblatt analyses the manners of social interaction 
in English Renaissance, which had their basis only in 
the self-reference of the individual. Those manners of 
interaction and relationship shaped appearances and 
behaviour by an attitude of always veiling inwardness 
and, at the same time, imposing those self-patterns of 
conduct on the other, generally defined as an alien. It 
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was a way of conquering prestige and social power 
through violence and aggression against the other. 
Greenblatt studies the notion of self-fashioning, since 
in the 16
th
 century individuals, identities and 
behaviours could be fashioned and manipulated 
artificially, based on the self-reference of the subject 
in something outside him.  
For Greenblatt, Shakespeare’s male 
characters are constantly worried about constructing 
and defining their masculinity and identity. Yet these 
constructions are done exclusively through 
abrogation, violence, and aggression towards the 
woman, the Moor, the Jew, the Witch or the other. 
This kind of attitude was not strange in terms of 
social and public attitudes in Renaissance age.
4
 
According to Greenblatt,  
 
self-fashioning occurs at the point of 
encounter between an authority and an 
alien, that what is produced in this 
encounter partakes of both the authority 
and the alien that is marked for attack, 
and hence that any authority achieved 
identity always contains within itself the 
signs of its own subversion or loss. 
(1984, p. 09).  
 
The invention of the alien can be seen as 
closely intermingled, yet this aggression is veiled and 
hidden through self-fashioning in the modes of 
interaction in language. There were ‘always some 
elements of deliberate shaping in the formation and 
expression of identity’. (1984, p. 01). Probably, there 
was much less autonomy in the self-fashioning in the 
16
th
 century than beforehand, so that the discipline 
imposed on subjects of the middle-class and 
                                                             
4 Stephen Greenblatt analyses works by Tomas Morus, Tyndale, 
Wyatt, Spenser, Marlowe, and Shakespeare, showing that their 
works build up the characters’ social and economic ascension 
through many modulations and impositions of language and 
power. Thus, those attitudes could be seen as a way for those very 
authors of insinuating manners of construction of their own 
identities and creating mechanisms of imposition and conquering 
benefits, prestige and social power through violence, abrogation, 
and aggression against the other. 
aristocratic subjects by social institutions, such as 
family, state and church, was too severe. Autonomy 
was an evident problem in that age, but it was not a 
fundamental one. What was more important during 
the 16
th
 and 17
th
 century was that there was a deep 
change in the intellectual, social, psychological, and 
aesthetical institutions, which used to determine the 
fashioning of individual identities (1984, p. 01). In 
Greenblatt’s opinion, if there occurred changes in the 
social mobility, there consequently emerged new 
modulating moods of power by both family and state, 
which determined social mobility in that age (1984, 
p. 02). The author finds out that the 16
th
 century is a 
moment of the emergence of an ‘increased self-
consciousness about fashioning of human identity as 
manipulable, artful process.’ (1984, p. 02). Hence, 
changes of self-fashioning attitude in English 
Renaissance had caused changes of meaning which 
provoked anxieties and suspicion. This may not 
suggest something positive any more, a social 
practice linked to manners and demeanours of the 
elite, teachers and parents, but ‘it may suggest also 
hypocrisy, deception, and adherence to mere outward 
ceremony.’ (1984, p. 03). As Greenblatt defines,  
 
Self-fashioning is in effect the 
Renaissance version of these control 
mechanisms, the cultural system of 
meanings that creates specific 
individuals by governing the passage 
from abstract potential to concrete 
historical embodiment. Literature 
functions within this system in three 
interlocking ways: as a manifestation of 
the concrete behavior of its particular 
author, as itself the expression of the 
codes by which behavior is shaped, and 
as a reflection upon those codes. (1984, 
p. 3-4)  
 
By analyzing texts of the authors and the 
personal life of Tomas Morus, Tyndale, Wyatt, 
Spencer, Marlowe and Shakespeare, Greenblatt 
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interprets the social interaction among the symbolic 
structures perceived in those authors’ lives and in 
society as constituting a single complex process of 
self-fashioning, in order to understand how social 
identities were fashioned and shaped in the English 
culture in the 16
th
 century (1984, p. 06). According to 
Greenblatt, it is possible  
 
to achieve a concrete apprehension of 
the consequences for human expression 
– for the ‘I’ – of a specific form of 
power, power at once localized in 
particular institutions – the court, the 
church, the colonial administration, the 
patriarchal family – and diffused in 
ideology structures of meaning, 
characteristic modes of expression, 
recurrent narrative patterns. (1984, p. 06)  
 
Greenblatt is concerned with a common 
feature very particular to all the authors, i. e., they 
embody a deep economic, social, and cultural 
mobility. All of them had come out from a limited 
social context circumscribed by powerful figures. 
They almost had no contact with power, yet they had 
got it with their ability of self-fashioning, even 
though deception comes as a negative result of the 
self’s construction of their own image.  
Furthermore, inwardness has two sides: the 
euphoric inwardness of a new sort of human 
cleverness, as in Machiavelli’s exultation with the 
powers of manipulation. But there is also the dark 
side of inwardness: the discovery of helplessness 
when the subject gets lost in his own tricks, 
perceptions, calculations such as Shakespeare’s 
Hamlet, Lear, Macbeth, Richard III and Shylock, who 
are good examples of these two sides of inwardness. 
This discovery of helplessness at the end of the plays 
points to the perceptiveness that something obscure 
and tenuously uncontrolled pervaded the character’s 
act and made them the victims of their own misacts.  
Taking into account the theatrical side of 
inwardness, McGinn’s analysis points out that 
another way of considering this issue is that society 
imposes a role upon the subject, and it is up to him to 
perfect it or not: ‘good son, dutiful father, regal 
monarch’, and so forth. (2007, p. 12). This theatrical 
dimensions of the inward self alludes to a self-
fashioned dimension determined by the outer super-
egoic structures. There are super-egoic mechanisms
5
 
in society which circumscribe the self in a restricted 
domain, such as the State, family, religion, 
censorship, and school. In Elizabeth I’s rein she 
always wanted her subjects to pay attention to formal 
(theatrical) attitudes to respect the establishment’s 
policies and actions. In fact, she just wanted the 
people to keep the ‘outward’ attitude of respecting 
her policies and restraining social disorder and revolt. 
As she affirmed once, she did not wish to make a 
‘window in men’s minds’,6 but just to assert the 
outward respect to conventional cerimonies. 
From this point of view, the idea of the 
character is just an illusion, a construct, a ‘varying 
flux of mental events’ (2007, p. 37). That is why a 
person needs to convey an impression of a particular 
self to the audience: ‘this management of behaviour’ 
is similar to the skills employed by an actor. There is 
an intention behind that, i. e., producing appearances, 
illusions and impression. Thus, inwardness in 
Renaissance Age could be perceived as theatrical and 
shaped, even though some polemists resisted such 
assumption, assuming that inwardness should true 
and sincere. From a dramatic point of view, these are 
not just false impressions, but this is an issue that 
‘constitutes the self’. This complex process provides 
the self with a particular identity which envisages and 
                                                             
5 Stephen Collins, in his book From Divine Cosmos to 
Sovereign State (1989), points out that the Tudor’s Society was 
superegoic-oriented, in the sense that all social domains were 
controlled and pre-determined by ideological mechanisms which 
circumscribed the individual in his social domain.  
6 See Neville Williams’ biography Elizabeth the first, Queen of 
England. New York, Dutton, 1962. 
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enacts certain roles (2007, p. 46). Coupled with that, 
the self is not constituted by one single dimension: 
‘there is not a single personality, lurking somehow 
behind the other, but a whole range, depending upon 
the audience.’ (2007, p. 46-47). The self has to be 
envisaged, desired, chosen, and built up in a certain 
way. Imitation plays an important role, because 
people build their selves observing and imitating 
others.  
Furthermore, the effects of social intitutions 
created in the self a sense of being predetermined and 
controlled in his innermost dimensions. These super-
egoic mechanisms remain unconscious in the self’s 
inwardness and come out morphed in feelings, 
emotions and anxieties, whose causes are completely 
effaced from the self’s awareness. In that sense, 
McGinn points out that Shakespeare  
 
regarded the mind as subject to hidden 
and mysterious forces. It is not that 
everything that affects a person is 
transparent to her awareness, so that she 
always knows why she is doing what she 
is or feeling the way she does. Not 
everything in the psyche is subject to the 
person’s rational control. The 
imagination, in particular, is vulnerable 
to this kind of irrational influence. 
(2007, p. 12, italics added).  
 
Thus, there are dimensions which elude the 
conscious determinations of the self. They are 
unnoticeable to the self, as the psychic traits incrusted 
in inwardness. Because of these forces, the self can 
be divided, even fragmented. McGinn states that  
 
The character is a ‘stranger to himself,’ 
that he is coexisting with a part of his 
psyche that is subject to unruly forces. 
The self is not always a harmonious 
whole, running on rational principles, 
but often a mélange of conflicting 
forces, the source of which is unclear. 
We are as much victims of ourselves as 
we are of the world around us, with one 
part of the psyche in rebellion against 
the rest. Accordingly, we can be 
mysteries to ourselves, bewildered by 
our feelings and actions. (2007, p. 12).  
 
The self can be metaphorically described as 
waves of ‘mental fluctuations’ which change and 
reconfigurate as soon as the self is moved by any 
inward or outward circumstance. McGinn affirms that 
‘the mind can be in conflict with itself, and the self 
can be correspondingly fractured. Consequently, self-
knowledge,  like knowledge of the other selves, is not 
always reliable; a person can be quite wrong about 
his or her character, and the way his mind operates’ 
(2007, p. 12). These mental fluxes change all the time 
and lead to the rebuilding of the self, in a way that it 
cannot be fully aware of that change, or does not feel 
and cannot even imagine his inner changing 
dimensions. The self is not a mere ‘static essence’, as 
a steady entity through all the experiences of the 
individual, but it is ‘a dynamic and variable thing, 
endlessly malleable’. (2007, p. 27). 
Furthermore, McGinn analyses 
Shakespeare’s plays based on philosophical ideas, 
such as knowledge, scepticism, and causality. 
Concepts and doctrines refer to the self as a unified 
persona that sustains us during our whole life, but as 
we look deep into it, we only encounter this ‘mental 
flux’. McGinn asks whether it is possible to find out 
just by introspection what this self really is: ‘we only 
find particular conscious occurrences – sensations, 
emotions, thoughts.’ (2007, p. 37). What we feel and 
suppose to be our character is just a ‘kind of 
hypothetical construct’, not a ‘datum of a 
consciousness’.  
McGinn states that limitations of 
knowledge are incrusted in the structure of the human 
beings’ cognitive faculties and their location in the 
world. Everything that is sought to know goes beyond 
our means of understanding and comprehension. We 
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always make inferences of what is going on in a 
person’s mind and ‘these inferences are both fallible 
and structurally suspect.’ (McGinn, 2007, p. 63). 
Making inferences is always influenced by our own 
feelings and conceptions. We wonder what goes on 
inside people’s mind, but their minds are not 
available for us to read in their forehead. Then, what 
we see is always filtered by our inward feelings, 
sensations, prejudices, ideas and thoughts. When a 
person is aware of the impenetrability of her mind, 
she can use this asymmetry to hide and deceive 
people around her. The mind is a domain of potential 
concealment, and this concealment is determined by 
somebody’s will. Even though we consider any 
possible way of analysis, it is not enough to fulfil 
persuasively the epistemological gap between the 
inward and outward. For example, the role of 
language is significant as we deal with concealment. 
Language makes it possible to know somebody’s 
mind, but it also enables to conceal a person’s mind. 
McGinn points out that ‘we can use language as a 
barrier, not a conduit, a means of deception, not 
revelation. Language facilitates active concealment, 
and the better a person is at using it, the better he 
becomes at deceiving the others’. (2007, p. 65). 
Lying is also a possibility that leads people to 
misunderstand a sincere person: a person can 
desperately try to reveal herself to somebody, and, 
although she tries it most convincibly, her sincere 
statements might be disregarded and considered as 
intentional falsehood (McGinn, 2007, p. 65). That is 
Cordelia’s and Desdemona’s case. They try to be as 
sincere as they can, but Lear and Othello do not read 
their plainness is the real representation of 
inwardness, but only as deceitfulness. 
Furthermore, the inward space might be a 
mere simulacrum, consequent of the erroneous 
perceptiveness of the other. For Baudriallard (1991), 
simulacrum is a false image of the real, since when 
one think he see the real object, he is in fact defining 
just an image of what it could be. In the same sense, 
inwardness can be delusive due to the erroneous 
perceptiveness of the other and even of us. What is 
imagined may be what one wants to see or want to 
be.
7
 The inner world is just perceived and imagined 
by the appareances which are no guarantee of the real 
inner feelings, ideas, thoughts and emotions. 
Likewise, lying is a barrier to canceal the self’s 
inwardness, creating a simulacrum of what really 
goes within the self.  
Furthermore, McGinn suggests that the 
sensibility and the body are intermingled dimensions 
of the self. Mind and body are closely connected and 
this is essential to determine and constitute the self. 
The embodied agency highlighted by McGinn is not 
essentially transcendent or idealistic, but it is the 
confluence of sensibility and rationality. Even 
nowadays, as McGinn points out, this is not quite 
well-estimeemed. Just with the emergence of 
neurosciences, scholars are looking more carefully to 
these dimensions of the human being, as Damasio 
does.
8
 For McGinn, imagination has an essential role 
in thinking and thus Shakespeare makes  
 
an emendation to the kind of “faculty of 
psychology” common in his time, a 
conception of the mind as an amalgam 
of distinct faculties, various in nature, 
yet interacting. While traditional authors 
restricted themselves to the three 
faculties of Reason, Passion, and Will, 
Shakespeare adds the faculty of 
Imagination, to be accorded the same 
status as the classic three. The 
imagination is just as much of a force in 
the psyche as the other three, and cannot 
                                                             
7 The idea of inwardness as a simulacrum is an interesting 
suggestion to others research on inwardness. It was not possible 
to analyze such trait of inwardness in this thesis, because it works 
on the analysis and configuration of the constellations of 
inwardness, in order to map the rhetoric of inwardness in the 
play. For more details on the simulacrum, see Baudriallard 
(1991).   
8 See Damasio, Descartes’ Error, 2006. 
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be reduced to some sort of “faint copy” 
of sense impressions. […] As a natural 
psychologist, Shakespeare is insisting on 
the centrality of the imagination in the 
human mind – with Macbeth an extreme 
case of something universal. This 
emphasis on the imagination did not 
really resurface until the Romanticism of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
with Coleridge, Blake, and others. It has 
yet to be fully appreciated in 
philosophical and psychological circles 
even today. (2007, p. 99).  
 
It is factual that Shakespeare, in certain 
ways, anticipates the romantic high esteem of the 
imagination and the self. There are many plays which 
heavily invest in the capacities of imagination, 
creating elaborate labyrinths of mutual (and mutually 
tragic) fantasies: just think of Hamlet, Macbeth and 
King Lear, for example. In a certain way, 
Shakespeare foresees that the imagination is not 
ancillary to rationality, but that it is the essential 
ingredient of rational understanding. Almost like a 
Kantian avant la lettre
9
, Shakespeare stages 
rationality as feeding on imagination; the operations 
of fantasy are its core support, and a pre-condition of 
analysis and cognition. McGinn states that 
Shakespeare is a moral psychologist: 
 
He knows that human psychology and 
ethical evaluation are never far apart. 
For the human mind has considerations 
of morality built into its very structure. 
We cannot really describe a person’s 
psychology without adverting to moral 
matters, since virtues and vices make up 
character. One person is described as 
kind, generous, open-minded, and 
judicious; another is said to be cruel, 
miserly, closed-minded, and rash: there 
are all aspects of character, and they are 
all morally evaluative. There is no value-
                                                             
9  In that sense, it is interesting to consider those assumptions in 
order to present some ideas about inwardness. In that sense, if we 
take into account judgement as something essential in analysing 
Shakespeare’s plays, we shall consider one of the most striking 
philosophical systems that ever showed the issue of judgement 
before Kant’s Critiques.  
free description of human psychological 
nature. (2007, p. 174).  
 
McGinn remarks that it is impossible to 
judge and evaluate somebody without moral and 
evaluative categories. If someone were asked to 
describe his friend without moral categories, the 
description would be uninformative and limited to 
physical characteristics. We are naturally bound to 
describe people with evaluative categories, whether 
they are qualitative or quantitative. Thus, people are 
always judging the other whenever they talk about 
others or describe them.  
Therefore, the problem of knowledge, 
conscience and judgement pervade Shakespeare’s 
plays, especially The Merchant of Venice. 
Inwardness is deeply related to the perception and 
judgement of the other characters, who are seen and 
analyZed by the others; it occurs through language, 
but it is a phenomenon which can also be perceived 
through the silences, the non-said, verbal slips, 
pathos, gestures, conscience and anxieties of the 
characters; also, the dramatist creates the idea of 
inwardness, by being convincing in his creation of a 
mimesis of inwardness. Thus, the mirroring device 
enables the mimesis of the inward dimensions of one 
character by mirroring his attitudes and emotions on 
the other. Specifically in The Merchant of Venice 
the mirroring device is a literary and theatrical 
technique whereby Shakespeare suggests one 
character’s feelings and inward dimensions projected 
and mirrored on other characters’ attitudes, actions, 
ideas and thoughts. The fantasmatic anxiety on the 
double of appearances and inward dimensions is 
commonly represented in Shakespeare’s drama. 
Therefore, in this thesis Mimesis is related 
to Auerbach’s notion of mimesis in his Mimesis 
(2007c), rather than to Aristotle’s concept of mimesis 
in his Poetics. Unfortunately, Auerbach is much more 
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concerned only with the representation of reality 
through styles, both lower and higher styles, and 
language. Though he is not worried to depict the 
inwardness or subjectivity of a character, he writes an 
interesting and revelatory analysis of Shylock which 
will be of great use in chapters 7 and 8 of this 
thesis.
10
 To complement Auerbach’s discussion of the 
problem of representation in the Renaissance, 
Claude-Gilbert Dubois also presents a renewing 
reading of the notion of mimesis which places the 
problem in Shakespeare’s age, which will be also 
important for the analysis of the play. His focuses on 
the mirror as a technological discovery that was 
incorporated in arts and literature as a topos of 
representing the other. The mirror represented a 
unique discovery which fascinated people and created 
an astonishing impact on the ways of perceiving 
reality during 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries.  
Another important detail of the play is that 
The Merchant of Venice does not seem to be a mere 
comedy. The use of such genre is suggestive, because 
it enables to introduce ambiguities in the text, letting 
the reader and the audience feels ambivalent 
reactions: on the one hand laughing at Shylock’s 
comic traits and at the play’s happy ending, on the 
other hand, bitterly feeling the awkward sensations 
that Shylock is simply ruined without moral scruples. 
The tragic and comic opposition in the play 
constructs the character of the play, especially 
Shylock, as a rather complex character. His hatred 
and his rage may seem comic, but they suggest and 
represent his inward feelings and dimensions: his 
hatred, desire of revenge, resentment and anxieties.  
Furthermore, the Shakespearean mirroring 
device suggests that Shakespeare probably perceived 
intuitively and represented foreclosure in the play. He 
                                                             
10  For this see especially in Auebach’s Mimesis, chapter 13 
wherein he analyses Shakespeare’s plays, especially Hamlet, 
Macbeth, King Lear and The Merchant of Venice.  
represented some awkward obscure dimensions of the 
characters of the play, especially Antonio and Portia, 
dimensions which are not perceived by them. For 
instance, Antonio’s ambivalent relationship to 
Shylock, a relationship signaled both in his hatred 
and in his submissive acceptance of his bond, hides in 
the lines the ever-denied and foreclosed anxiety 
towards the cause of his sadness and discontent: the 
anxiety regarding the paternal figure re-imagined in 
Shylock. Such idea of the foreclosed cause Antonio’s 
anxiety in his inwardness also can be only seen 
mirrored in the other characters’ anxieties in the play: 
Jessica’s unhappiness and tediousness, Launcelot’s 
conscience to the Jew his master, Portia’s anxiety 
regarding the casket test are all anxieties whose cause 
lay in the paternal figure, epitomized in Shylock, the 
ur-father, the primordial father of the play, according 
to Adelman (2008, p. 131). The other characters’ 
anxiety is clearly doubled by the most comic and 
seemingly secondary character in the play, Launcelot. 
In II, ii, Launcelot strangely drives the anxiety 
towards the biological father to Shylock: instead of 
feeling his conscience when he cheats and mocks his 
blind father, Gobbo, he feels his conscience and 
anxiety when he desires to leave Shylock’s house. If 
Jessica’s, Portia’s and Launcelot’s uneasiness in the 
play is caused by the paternal figure, contiguously 
Antonio’s sadness and discontent is due to the absent 
presence of the paternal figure in the play, projected 
onto Shylock, though foreclosed from his inwardness 
and from the play. Shakespeare perceived at least in a 
subtler level the obscure dimensions of the 
unconscious acting on the self’s attitudes, dimensions 
whose causes are quite effaced from the self’s 
consciousness, which Lacan’s Psychoanalysis names 
foreclosure. Shakespeare intuitively perceived 
something occluded and denied in human behavior 
which will be important to Psychoanalysis. The 
suggested foreclosed cause of Antonio’s inwardness 
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is a technique to represent his inward anxieties, 
insinuated in his sadness and weariness in the play.  
Moreover, in the case of The Merchant of 
Venice, bodily traits such as weariness, sadness, 
tediousness and discontent are symptomatic of 
psychic traits incrusted in the inner-self, which come 
out in moments of tension, especially for Antonio, 
Bassanio, Portia, Shylock and Antonio. Therefore, 
there are explicit contents and, beyond them, 
suggestions which have to be read between the lines 
of the words and sentences, in the constellations of 
gestures, repetitions, strange details, dissonances, 
verbal slips, silences and pathos. That is how 
Shakespeare constructed hi mimesis of inwardness in 
the play. 
 
FINAL REMARKS 
This essay discussed and analyzed the 
concepts of Early Renaissance inwardness and 
modern  subjectivity. The discussion was framed 
especially by Maus’ assumptions in her book 
Inwardness and Theater in the English 
Renaissance (1995), and McGinn’s work 
Shakespeare’s Philosophy (2007). Katharine Maus 
discusses the dichotomy between inwardness and 
outwardness which was a remarkable characteristic in 
Renaissance, especially in Shakespeare’s works and 
in contemporary discourses. The Elizabethan writers 
were quite aware and worried about the distinctions 
between the outward and inward dimensions of the 
self and of things. In that sense, Maus analyzes 
inwardness opposed to outwardness. Maus takes into 
consideration the differences between an unutterable 
inner-self and a theatrical calculated outward which 
can be intentionally shaped. She investigates the 
epistemological anxieties caused by the gap between 
inwardness and outwardenss. In analyzing the 
controversies about the consciousness of inwardness, 
Maus remarks the emergence of a great number of 
discourses, which presented the differences between 
inwardness and outwardness, a rhetorical and 
discursive distinction very common in 16
th
 and 17
th
 
centuries. 
Furthermore, in Shakespeare it is possible to 
notice some psychic dimensions represented in the 
characters of his plays. He intuitively perceived some 
mysterious dimensions that the self cannot control in 
his inwardness. Shakespeare noticed inward 
dimensions appearing in the obscure, sinister, 
uncontrolled dispositions of the self. He overcame his 
contemporaries and represented such mysterious 
uncontrolled dimensions of the self in the drama. 
Though Maus simply analyzes inwardness as a 
cultural and historical event, Shakespeare represented 
more than that: he portrayed the obscure and 
mysterious psychic elements that determined and 
shaped inwardness. The mysterious forces of the self, 
pointed out by McGinn (2007), are obscure 
uncontrolled dimensions of the inward world of the 
self. It is represented through the characters’ silences, 
verbal slips, non-said, ruptures of speech, the 
character’s conscience, pathos, gestures, and bodily 
feelings. Such mysteriousness is embodied in 
inwardness and determines the self’s actions, 
feelings, emotions, ideas and thoughts. 
Thus, inwardness is an inner space rooted in 
inward mysterious dimensions, which are suggested 
in judgement, conscience, and anxieties. McGinn 
(2007) also analyses the problem of inwardness 
taking into account the self, his constitution, and his 
implications in some of Shakespeare’s plays. Thus, 
Shakespeare works with several levels such as 
judgements and conscious manipulations, involuntary 
gestures and anxieties, suggesting desires, intentions, 
reasoning which are beyond conscious will and 
feeling. There is something in the self that goes 
beyond our understanding and which deludes it all 
the time. Inwardness is more or less comparable to 
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the mental floatations, suggesting divations and inner 
debate. In that sense, indeterminacy, vagueness and a 
set of ‘mental fluxes’ make room to ambiguity, 
paradoxes, and incongruity of the self.  
Inwardness is an epochal cultural construct. 
However, its traits are very different from the modern 
concept of subjectivity. Inwardness is still a broader 
notion in English Renaissance Age, rather than our 
conception of subjectivity, which is inevitably 
constituted by philosophical concepts and 
psychoanalytic assumptions. In fact, the notion of 
modern subject is invested with different traits 
enhanced by diverse philosophical and 
psychoanalytic discourses and assumptions.  
 
Todos os autores declararam não haver qualquer 
potencial conflito de interesses referente a este artigo. 
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